As mentioned in the book, despite being enshrined in many instruments, not all countries appear to agree that economic coercion is covered by the non-intervention principle. Given the manner in which economic coercion has been used in the past years and is used now, I truly believe that it should.

Thank you for engaging! We’ve analysed the PIL and WTO compliance in one of the chapters here www.cambridge.org/md/universit...

Indeed, I would say - WTO violation and economic coercion, the last in my opinion giving a legal basis for countries to act despite Art. 23 DSU.

Prohibited intervention implies 2 elements: 1) coercion; 2) bearing on matters in the domaine reserve. The last, according to ICJ’s Nicaragua case, also includes the foreign policy. Moreover, US tariffs could also be said to try to influence internal policy, e.g. VATs.

We show that despide certain disparities, there are many parallels in how these tools are drafted, as well as applied and interpreted in jurisprudence, showcasing the development of #constitutionalism in trade and investment policy in view of other public policies.

The monograph analyses recent and recently amended EU tools, such as the Trade Enforcement Regulation, Anticoercion Instrument #ACI, #FSR, #IPI Regulation, and #CBAM and their conformity with #EU's int'l commitments, particularly #WTO, #EUFTA, and int'l environmental rules.