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Christian Mott
@cjmott.bsky.social
900 followers 1.3K following 1.7K posts
Moral psychology & experimental jurisprudence. Interested in mental state attributions, risk, punishment, personal identity, criminal law & procedure, constitutional & statutory interpretation, statistics, etc., etc., etc. christianmott.com
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cjmott.bsky.social
Per this February 2020 NYT story on signed Trump memorabilia, Trump has two different signatures.
NYT Excerpt from February 2020 story: "Steve Grad, principal authenticator for Beckett, keeps a file of Mr. Trump’s signature going back to the 1980s for comparison. He said that Mr. Trump had two: one that resembles 'a seismogram reading after an earthquake,' and another that is more legible."
September 8, 2025 at 7:49 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Probably the guidance in the image, which appears at the linked BOP document at p. 51 of the pdf: www.bop.gov/policy/progs...

Maxwell's offenses of conviction fall into category (6), per this: www.bop.gov/policy/progs...

Maxwell is now in a Minimum security facility, which is lower than Low.
BOP guidance on Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification, passage from p. 51. Sex Offender. A male or female inmate whose behavior in the current term of confinement or prior history includes one or more of the following elements will be housed in at least a Low security level institution, unless the PSF has been waived. A conviction is not required for application of this PSF if the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), or other official documentation, clearly indicates the following behavior occurred in the current term of confinement or prior criminal history. If the case was dismissed or nolle prosequi, application of this PSF cannot be entered.
August 6, 2025 at 2:30 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
Seems like JD Vance should have some words with John Roberts.
Passage from Rucho v. Common Cause, slip op. at 16: Partisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional representation. As Justice O’Connor put it, such claims are based on “a conviction that the greater the departure from proportionality, the more suspect an apportionment plan becomes.” Ibid. “Our cases, however, clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.” Id., at 130 (plurality opinion). See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 75–76 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation as an imperative of political organization.”).
July 30, 2025 at 4:40 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Couldn't this fall into the the newly passed double jeopardy exception at CPL 40.51(4) or (5)? (Seems like it would depend on whether there's potential civil or criminal liability for anything Maxwell knows, which seems possible given the possibility of future statute of limitations extension laws.)
CPL 40.51 says that double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecution of someone federally convicted if that person was pardoned and 4. the president who granted such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency to such person (a) was thereby aided in avoiding potential prosecution or conviction; (b) knowingly obtained a benefit from such offense; or (c) knowingly obtained a tangible, material benefit from or on behalf of such person; or 5. such person possessed or possesses information material to the determination of any criminal or civil investigation, enforcement action or prosecution of the president granting such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency, or of one or more persons described in subdivision one, two or three of this section.
July 26, 2025 at 2:45 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
Take also this argument. SCOTUS only feels "forced" to resolve those "significant and difficult" questions of law on the shadow docket because it refuses to apply its normal stay factors to government stay petitions. If they did, they wouldn't always need to reach the merits.
Passage from pp. 20-21 of the majority opinion in Trump v. CASA: "When a district court issues a universal injunction, thereby halting the enforcement of federal policy the Government says that it has little recourse but to proceed to the court of appeals for an emergency stay. The loser int he court of appeals will then seek a stay from this Court. This process forces courts to resolve significant and difficult questions of law on a highly expedited basis and without full briefing." (citations omitted)
June 27, 2025 at 3:31 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
If what Matt says is true, it will just make people on the left want to make every union more like @uaw.org.
UAW Region 9A graphic reading: Fill out your ballot 1. Zohran Mamdani 2. Brad Lander 3. Zellnor Myrie 4. Adrienne Adams 5. Michael Blake and Don't rank Cuomo!
June 21, 2025 at 1:05 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
First, the court says the "through the governor" language could not require the governor's consent because another section of title 10 requires the governor's consent more explicitly. The problem? 10 USC 12301 was enacted in 1952. The "through to governor" language was enacted in 1908.
Section from p. 32 of the Ninth Circuit order in Newsom v. Trump: "First, the text of § 12406 does not give governors any veto power over the President’s federalization decision. The omission of an express consent requirement is telling, as Congress provided governors with veto power in another section of Title 10. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) ('However, a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State concerned.' (emphasis added))."
June 20, 2025 at 3:34 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
The opinion ends with this puzzling paragraph, which appears to argue that religious discrimination falls outside Title VI entirely... and infers that the President must therefore have some unspecified other authority, outside Title VI, to withdraw funding from schools for religious discrimination.
Passage from AAUP v. DOJ, ECF 148 at 29-30. "[A]ll of Plaintiffs' arguments that Defendants violated the APA (and the separation of powers) by failing to comply with procedural requirements for cutting funding pursuant to Title VI simply presuppose that Title VI is the exclusive vehicle by which the Executive Branch may withdraw financial support for an institution that allows religious discrimination. "The Court urges Plaintiffs, and the amici who decry Defendants' alleged failure to follow Title VI to the letter, to review the text of that statute. Title VI does not mention religion. As such, it strikes the Court as unlikely that Title VI is the sole and exclusive 'legal tool[]' available to a President who instructs executive agencies to prioritize 'combat[ting] anti-Semitism . . . on university and college campuses.'" (citations omitted)
June 16, 2025 at 10:52 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Surprisingly, the injury-in-fact analysis is even worse.

This paragraph finds that all the grant terminations at Columbia can be fully covered by Columbia's endowment, private donations, and tuition payments, despite there being no evidence that's true and plenty of evidence to the contrary.
Passage from p. 24 of AAUP v. DOJ, ECF 148 at 24-25: "Turning to representational standing, Plaintiffs fail to establish that any injuries their members may have suffered are fairly traceable to Defendants. As noted above, the Court does find that some of Plaintiffs [sic] members used federal grants to Columbia for their academic work. The loss of professional opportunities or income may certainly constitute an injury in some cases. However, here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that it makes a difference to their members whether the funding for their research and salaries comes from American taxpayers, non-party Columbia's multi-billion-dollar endowment, the largess of Columbia's donors, or the eye-popping tuition bills paid by Columbia students, including the Jewish students who apparently paid for the privilege of being threatened with violence on their way to class." (citations omitted)
June 16, 2025 at 9:40 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Unfortunately, now I can't think about it without also thinking about Justice Gorsuch's considerably less elegant rewrite in 303 Creative.
Passage from Justice Gorsuch's opinion for the Court in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 21-476, slip op. at 7 (June 30, 2023): "For all these reasons '[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,' West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), it is the principle that the government may not interfere with 'an uninhibited marketplace of ideas,' McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014)."
June 14, 2025 at 7:02 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Instead, DOJ argues that its position follows from the plain meaning of "though." DOJ also makes a policy argument: It would have been bad if 10 USC 12406 allowed a governor to veto a President's order because then Governor Faubus could have vetoed President Eisenhower's order during Little Rock.
Passage from p. 18 of DOJ's filing. In short, Section 12406 affords no veto to Governor Newsom over the President's decision to call forth the guard, just as it afforded no veto to Governor Faubus when President Eisenhower last invoked the predecessor to Section 12406 to ensure that the enforcement of federal law was not obstructed.
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
In 1911, the Army Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Wood, made the same point, arguing that the 1903 and 1908 Militia Acts had restricted the President's power over the militia (which he thought was bad).

There may be arguments why this historical interpretation was wrong; DOJ doesn't offer any.
Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, pp. 12-13. Mr. LLOYD. What do you think of the constitutional authority of Congress passing a law allowing the War Department to call these men in the service directly from the militia without the authority of the governor of the State, without calling on the governor of the State first? Gen. WOOD. The President will call on the governor for troops, but in case the governor fails to respond he can then call upon the troops themselves. They must come. They can not evade the call on the ground that it has not come through the governor of the State, or on any other ground. The present militia law, known as the "Dick law," provides that the militia can only be called by a call issued through the governor of the State. This seems to be a dangerous limitation of the powers of the Chief Executive, and might lead to embarrassment. The old militia law was better: The President could call every man of arms-bearing age; he could call everybody who was sound and within the age limit, who was not exempted by law. The CHAIRMAN. Without reference to what the governor would do? Gen. WOOD. Yes. Mr. LLOYD. He did not call you as a militiaman, though did he? Gen. WOOD. He was called as part of the militia. Capt. HAGOOD. Yes: He had the right to call everybody directly up to the time of the Dick law in 1903. Up to that time there was no provision as to calling the governor: it was only a matter of courtesy that that was done. Gen. WOOD. We now have no direct way of reaching the men, and the present conditions would lead to confusion. We know that in New England and other States farther south, on account of wars bearing unpopular, governors have not always responded when calls were made by the President.... Excerpt from the Congressional Record, February 28, 1911, p. 3701. Passage from a memorandum submitted by Maj. Gen. Wood, the Chief of Staff of the Army. "The militia organized under the old laws and the National Guard of today, however, are very different; so different, in fact, that it may not be considered altogether fair to class them together. But the improvement goes only so far as the defects in the old laws have been remedied, and the two are identically the same so far as the defects in the old laws have not been remedied. "The principal defects in the old militia laws were as follows: "1. Divided responsibility between the Federal Government and the States: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas have, through their governors, refused to turn out the militia when called upon by the President to do so. Other States have greatly interfered with the Federal Government in its use of militia either by raising objections and obstacles or by forcing the service of troops not desired. "The modern existing law instead of remedying this defect has intensified it. The old law did not require the President to consult the governors with reference to turning out the militia. He could issue the call direct. As a matter of courtesy, the call was made through the governors. But now it is required by law. There is no way for the Federal Government to coerce the governors, and if any governor should refuse or fail to transmit it to the militia of his State it is easy to see that the whole matter could be thrown into confusion...."
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
During the House debate over the 1908 Militia Act, an opponent of the bill, Rep. Parker, argued against the bill, in part, on the grounds that the "through the governor" language *would* give the governor a veto over a presidential order to a state militia.
Excerpt from the May 25, 1908 Congressional Record, p. 6942: Part of a statement from Representative Parker, of New Jersey: "Now, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on the Militia years ago we refused to bring up that law for revision for fear that by some mistake or amendment this power should be taken away from the President. "This bill, strange to say, without intending to do so, does take away that power; for in the first section, after saying that all males of a certain age belong to the militia, the bill divides them into two classes, the organized militia and the reserve militia, and with a proviso that the provisions of this act shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force. As a result the subsequent section 4, in which the authority for calling out the militia is reenacted, only applies to the organized militia, and the power of the President over every able-bodied citizen is taken away by this act. I consider that to be a matter that goes back to all questions of finance. "The old law of 1795 gave the President direct authority over every citizen of this land, and in this bill, in the section which provides that in case of rebellion or invasion, or threatened invasion, the President may issue a call, it is not provided that he may call out every able-bodied man, through their officers, but it provides that he may issue his orders for that purpose through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may deem proper. Why, we remember a time, at the beginning of the civil war, when some of the governors did not desire to have the militia called out, but we got our militia from West Virginia, and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky by the orders of the President direct."
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
10 USC 12406 is a recodification of 10 USC secs. 3500 (Army NG) and 8500 (Air NG), which were themselves codifications of the 1903 Militia Act (the "Dick Act"), as amended by the 1908 Militia Act. The 1908 Militia Act added the "through the governor" language to this statute.
1908 Militia Act text from 35 Stat. 400: "Sec. 3. That section four of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby amended and reenacted so as to read as follows: 'Sec. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose, through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may think proper."
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
DOJ has filed its opposition to Newsom's motion for a TRO in the National Guard case. They argue that the "through the governor" language in 10 USC 12406 does not allow the governor to veto a President's order to a state NG.

Historical evidence about the law's original meaning trends the other way.
Passage from p. 17 of DOJ's opposition to the motion for a TRO in Newsom v. Trump. 3. Section 12406 does not require a governor's consent or input. Defendants also acted lawfully in the processes they used to federalize Guardsmen. Section 12406's first sentence establishes the President's unilateral authority to federalize Guardsmen. Again, it reads: "[T]he President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State . . . ." The next sentence adds that "[o]rders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States." 10 U.S.C. sec. 12406. The statute is thus clear that the orders are issued by the President, and they are conveyed through State officials. Nothing in the statute entitles a Governor to veto or impede a valid presidential order.
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Maj. Gen. Wood submitted a memo, in connection with debate over a 1911 bill, that made similar points about his understanding of the role of the governor under the Dick law (that is, the 1903 Militia Act as amended by the 1908 Militia Act).

Suggests the governor's role is not merely "ministerial."
Excerpt from the Congressional Record, February 28, 1911, p. 3701. Passage from a memorandum submitted by Maj. Gen. Dick, the Chief of Staff of the Army. "The militia organized under the old laws and the National Guard of today, however, are very different; so different, in fact, that it may not be considered altogether fair to class them together. But the improvement goes only so far as the defects in the old laws have been remedied, and the two are identically the same so far as the defects in the old laws have not been remedied. "The principal defects in the old militia laws were as follows: "1. Divided responsibility between the Federal Government and the States: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas have, through their governors, refused to turn out the militia when called upon by the President to do so. Other States have greatly interfered with the Federal Government in its use of militia either by raising objections and obstacles or by forcing hte service of troops not desired. "The modern existing law instead of remedying this defect has intensified it. The old law did not require the President to consult the governors with reference to turning out the militia. He could issue the call direct. As a matter of courtesy, the call was made through the governors. But now it is required by law. There is no way for the Federal Government to coerce the governors, and if any governor should refuse or fail to transmit it to the militia of his State it is easy to see that the whole matter could be thrown into confusion...."
June 11, 2025 at 3:57 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
Here's some interesting subsequent history, from a 1911 hearing by the House Committee on Militia, in which Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, at the time the Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the interpretation that the 1908 Act required the cooperation of the governor to call up the militia.
Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, pp. 12-13. Mr. LLOYD. What do you think of the constitutional authority of Congress passing a law allowing the War Department to call these men in the service directly from the militia without the authority of the governor of the State, without calling on the governor of the State first? Gen. WOOD. The President will call on the governor for troops, but in case the governor fails to respond he can then call upon the troops themselves. They must come. They can not evade the call on the ground that it has not come through the governor of the State, or on any other ground. The present militia law, known as the "Dick law," provides that the militia can only be called by a call issued through the governor of the State. This seems to be a dangerous limitation of the powers of the Chief Executive, and might lead to embarrassment. The old militia law was better: The President could call every man of arms-bearing age; he could call everybody who was sound and within the age limit, who was not exempted by law. The CHAIRMAN. Without reference to what the governor would do? Gen. WOOD. Yes. Mr. LLOYD. He did not call you as a militiaman, though did he? Gen. WOOD. He was called as part of the militia. Capt. HAGOOD. Yes: He had the right to call everybody directly up to the time of the Dick law in 1903. Up to that time there was no provision as to calling the governor: it was only a matter of courtesy that that was done. Gen. WOOD. We now have no direct way of reaching the men, and the present conditions would lead to confusion. We know that in New England and other States farther south, on account of wars bearing unpopular, governors have not always responded when calls were made by the President.... Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, p. 14. Mr. LLOYD. That is the point I make, that the militia must be called through the governor. Therefore, I question the propriety of putting in this law that the War Department may call them independent of the governor. Capt. HAGOOD. The old act of 1795, which stood through all the intermediate wars, which authorized the President to make the call direct to any officer or enlisted man of the militia, was specifically repealed by the Dick law, and it was prescribed the call must be made through the governor. During the War of 1812, during the Mexican War, and during the Civil War the call could be made direct, and where the governors of some States--for instance, Pennsylvania--refused to issue the call, the question was brought up and went through the courts. The members of the militia of the State of Pennsylvania were court-martialed, and it was held by the courts that they could be court-martialed. But the Dick law has repealed that and makes it go through the governor.
June 11, 2025 at 3:29 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
One person (after Rep. Parker) who read this statute to require that presidential orders to a state NG go via the governor, who could veto, is Sen. Herman Talmadge, who in 1958 relied on this understanding to argue that this statute could not have allowed Eisenhower's use of the NG in Little Rock.
Excerpt from the Congressional Record, August 18, 1958, p. 18230: "Even in cases where the President is within his authority to call forth the militia to enforce the 'laws of the United States,' the law expressly provides that orders federalizing National Guard units 'shall be issued through the governors of the States.' "This is made plain in section 3500 of title 10 of the United States Code [the prior codification of 10 USC 12406], from which I quote: [Quoting the language of 10 USC 3500, which is materially identical to 10 USC 12406]. "None of the three conditions set forth in this section was met in the Little Rock case. There was no danger of invasion, there was no rebellion or danger of rebellion." Excerpt from the Congressional Record, August 18, 1958, p. 18231: "There was no pretense that the President was unable to execute the laws of the United States 'with the regular forces' of the Nation. "And even those factors to the contrary notwithstanding, the orders bringing the National Guard of Arkansas into Federal service wer enot issued through the Governor of that State as is required by code section 3500 above stated. "The President not only violated the provisions o that statute by his failure or refusal to act through the Governor of the State but he also violated another act of Congress which forbids the use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus."
June 9, 2025 at 2:14 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Though one of the bill's opponents, Mr. Parker, opposed it on the grounds it was taking away the President's power to command the militia directly. He assumed this new law would require the cooperation of a state's governor.
Excerpt from the May 25, 1908 Congressional Record, p. 6942: Part of a statement from Representative Parker, of New Jersey: "Now, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on the Militia years ago we refused to bring up that law for revision for fear that by some mistake or amendment this power should be taken away from the President. "This bill, strange to say, without intending to do so, does take away that power; for in the first section, after saying that all males of a certain age belong to the militia, the bill divides them into two classes, the organized militia and the reserve militia, and with a proviso that the provisions of this act shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force. As a result the subsequent section 4, in which the authority for calling out the militia is reenacted, only applies to the organized militia, and the power of the President over every able-bodied citizen is taken away by this act. I consider that to be a matter that goes back to all questions of finance. "The old law of 1795 gave the President direct authority over every citizen of this land, and in this bill, in the section which provides that in case of rebellion or invasion, or threatened invasion, the President may issue a call, it is not provided that he may call out every able-bodied man, through their officers, but it provides that he may issue his orders for that purpose through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may deem proper. Why, we remember a time, at the beginning of the civil war, when some of the governors did not desire to have the militia called out, but we got our militia from West Virginia, and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky by the orders of the President direct."
June 8, 2025 at 9:29 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
During the House debate after the Senate amendments (on May 25, 1908), a House supporter of the act argued that the President's authority over the militia under this bill was intended to match the (broad) constitutional grant. He misstates the constitutional text in a potentially revealing way.
Excerpt from p. 6943 of the Congressional Record for May 1908. The text reads: "Mr. FLOYD. My time is so limited that I regret I can not. There is one other question, and that is the constitutional question. A great argument is made against this bill by gentlemen who claim it enlarges the power of the President. I want to express my views on that question. The Constitution, as I understand it, provides that the President of the United States, through the governors of the several States, in time of war may call out the militia of the different States to repeal invasion, suppress insurrection, or to execute the laws of the United States. It is not within the power of this committee, it is not within the power of Congress to tkae from or add to that constitutional provision. That is a provision of the Constitution of the United States and lodges that power in the President of the United States, and ti is not within our power to add to or take from it, and we do not undertake to do that and do not understand we are doing that by this provision of the bill. [Applause.]
June 8, 2025 at 9:17 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
The passage providing that orders go through governors was specifically added by the Committee on Military Affairs. The Congressional Record on May 21, 1908 notes the amendment but doesn't say why it was added.

We'll see if the Committee on Military Affairs report is available somewhere...
Passage from the Congressional Record for May 21, 1908, p. 6661: Efficiency of the Militia. Mr. HEMENWAY. I desire to call up the bill (S. 4316) to further amend the act entitled "An act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes," approved January 21, 1903. There being no objection, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Military Affairs with amendments. The VICE-PRESIDENT. The bill has been read. The amendments will be stated. The first amendment of the Committe on Military Affairs was, on page 4, after line 15, to insert 'through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which..." Continuation of passage from the Congressional Record for May 21, 1908, p. 6661: State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, so as to read: [here is the same text as in my prior post of Sec. 3 of the 1908 Militia Act]
June 8, 2025 at 7:33 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
The relevant passage of the 1908 Militia Act appears in the attached screenshot.
1908 Militia Act text from 35 Stat. 400: "Sec. 3. That section four of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby amended and reenacted so as to read as follows: 'Sec. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose, through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may think proper."
June 8, 2025 at 6:57 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Not on Courtlistener yet, but here's the PACER entry. There's also a PI hearing scheduled for 6/16.
PACER docket entries from Harvard v. DHS. They read: 06/05/2025 59 Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ORDER entered granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (KF) (Entered: 06/05/2025) 06/05/2025 60 ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Hearing.Preliminary Injunction Hearing set for 6/16/2025 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 (In person only) before Judge Allison D. Burroughs. (KF) (Entered: 06/05/2025)
June 6, 2025 at 2:07 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
by subjecting them to visa revocation, arrest, detention, deportation, or any other adverse immigration action.

AAUP had to seek this order from the judge because the government wouldn't agree not to retaliate against witnesses.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Declaration of Noam Biale filed in AAUP v. Rubio. They read: 4. On June 3, 2025, we held a meet-and-confer call with Defendants in which we again raised the proposed Non-Retaliation Order. On that call, Defendants’ counsel advised that they could not agree to the proposed Non-Retaliation Order because their client agencies did not want to be bound by an agreement preventing them from taking action against individuals whose identities they did not know yet. 5. I clarified that the proposed Non-Retaliation Order was structured principally as an agreement not to take adverse actions against Plaintiffs’ witnesses because they were witnesses in this federal case, which we had not imagined would be difficult for the government to agree to. Defendants’ counsel reiterated that the agencies were “not comfortable” with such a proposal and advised us to “go ahead and ask the judge to rule on it.”
June 4, 2025 at 10:01 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Another element of this story that may or may not be relevant is that Columbia is currently undergoing an accreditation review. Unlike last time (in 2016), MSCHE staff recently requested several broad categories of supplemental information.
Screenshot from the MSCHE website listing for Columbia University. Entry for May 16, 2025 under "Accreditation Actions": "Staff acted on behalf of the Commission to request a supplemental information report, due May 30, 2025, that provides additional information on Standard II: Ethics and Integrity; Standard IV: Support of the Student Experience; Standard VI: Planning, Resources, and Institutional Improvement; and Standard VII: Governance, Leadership, and Administration. To note that the evaluation visit has occurred and will be acted upon by the Commission at the June 2025 meeting."
June 4, 2025 at 8:21 PM