Manuel Almagro
@almagro.bsky.social
Assistant Professor in philosphy at the University of Valencia
In the second part, we go further: the inherited notion of deep disagreement may actually conflict with central Wittgensteinian insights.
We suggest that the very idea of “deep disagreement” is, in an important sense, not really Wittgensteinian at all.
We suggest that the very idea of “deep disagreement” is, in an important sense, not really Wittgensteinian at all.
September 3, 2025 at 10:52 AM
In the second part, we go further: the inherited notion of deep disagreement may actually conflict with central Wittgensteinian insights.
We suggest that the very idea of “deep disagreement” is, in an important sense, not really Wittgensteinian at all.
We suggest that the very idea of “deep disagreement” is, in an important sense, not really Wittgensteinian at all.
In the first part, we argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics and moral judgments are at odds with the inherited notion of deep disagreement.
Moral disagreements are neither discussions about standards or worldviews, nor unfailingly constrained by the parties’ standards.
Moral disagreements are neither discussions about standards or worldviews, nor unfailingly constrained by the parties’ standards.
September 3, 2025 at 10:52 AM
In the first part, we argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics and moral judgments are at odds with the inherited notion of deep disagreement.
Moral disagreements are neither discussions about standards or worldviews, nor unfailingly constrained by the parties’ standards.
Moral disagreements are neither discussions about standards or worldviews, nor unfailingly constrained by the parties’ standards.