Vincent Pons
vinpons.bsky.social
Vincent Pons
@vinpons.bsky.social

Professor at Harvard Business School. Affiliate at NBER, CEPR, JPal. Cofounder at Explain. Column at Les Echos. Political economy, development, tech.

Vincent Pons is a French economist who is the Michael B. Kim Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. Pons's research focuses on questions in political economy and development economics. .. more

Political science 42%
Economics 21%

L'Europe saura-t-elle saisir les opportunités créées par la politique migratoire américaine ?
Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

Full paper accessible here: www.vincentpons.org/campaign-fin... (n/n).

Thus, receiving public funding may make less of a difference for them. Mayoral candidates also tend to spend more on average, making the marginal returns of campaign expenditures lower than in departmental elections (9/n).

In municipal elections, we do not find such effects. We attribute this to the list format used in these elections: while departmental election candidates run in single-member constituencies, municipal candidates can split campaign costs with the other members of their list (8/n).

Second, a separate RDD shows that candidates who pass the 5% vote share threshold required to be reimbursed are significantly more likely to compete in the next election (7/n).

These results appear to be driven by the reimbursement of campaign expenditures rather than spending limits. First, we do not find any effect in earlier departmental elections held after expenditure ceilings were introduced but before campaign expenditures started to be reimbursed. (6/n).

The campaign finance rules do not increase the polarization of elections and do not decrease the representativeness and the quality of the winner. They increase the probability that a candidate from the left is elected (5/n).

They decrease incumbents’ reelection rate by 15pp and benefit the runner-up of the previous race as well as new candidates. Incumbents are less likely to get reelected because they are less likely to run and get a lower vote share, conditional on running (4/n).

We use an RDD around that population threshold. In departmental elections, we find that these rules increase competitiveness and level the playing field between incumbents and other candidates (3/n).

We exploit a discontinuity in campaign finance rules in French local elections: above 9k inhabitants, candidates face spending limits and are eligible for the reimbursement of their expenditures up to 50% of the ceiling; below 9k inhabitants, expenditures are neither capped nor reimbursed (2/n).
Thrilled to see our paper on “Spending Limits, Public Funding, and Election Outcomes” published in the @jeeanews.bsky.social! 👇👇
We investigate the effects of far-reaching campaign finance rules, with Nikolaj Broberg and Clemence Tricaud.
Short thread on what we do and find (1/n).

Reposted by Vincent Pons

Forthcoming article "Spending Limits, Public Funding, and Election Outcomes" by Nikolaj Broberg @vinpons.bsky.social and Clemence Tricaud
@eeanews.bsky.social

doi.org/10.1093/jeea...
Spending Limits, Public Funding, and Election Outcomes
Abstract. This paper investigates the effects of campaign finance rules on electoral outcomes. In French local elections, candidates competing in districts
doi.org

Reposted by Vincent Pons

Reposted by Vincent Pons

NBER @nber.org · Nov 24
Studying the logic of state surveillance based on the universe of Italian files finds that states target educated and subaltern groups, with mobilization and radical change potential, from Gemma Dipoppa and Annalisa Pezone www.nber.org/papers/w34492

Quelles leçons tirer de la victoire de Milei? Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

Reposted by Vincent Pons

Et si l'on réformait enfin l'impôt sur les successions? Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇